For Germany, the German navy was above all an instrument of political pressure on Britain. Before the war, Germany would have been prepared to cease or moderate its maritime competition with Great Britain, but only in exchange for the promise of neutrality in any European conflict. Hitler tried the same thing with different methods, but like other German politicians, he saw only part of the picture. It is clear from his writings that he was extremely impressed by the rivalry role of the pre-war naval forces in creating bad relations between the two countries. He argued that the elimination of this rivalry was all that was necessary to maintain good relations. By making a free gift for the absence of maritime competition, he hoped that relations between the two countries would be improved so that Britain did not consider it necessary to interfere in German continental politics. Due to the length of time required to build warships and the short duration of the agreement, its effects were limited. German and British naval experts estimated that the earliest year germany reached the 35% limit was 1942. [47] In practice, the lack of shipbuilding, design problems, a shortage of skilled labour and a shortage of foreign exchange to buy the necessary raw materials slowed the reconstruction of the German navy.

A shortage of steel and non-ferrous metals, due to the fact that the navy was in third place in terms of German rearmament priorities, meant that the navy (as the German navy had been renamed in 1935) was still far from the 35% limit when Hitler denounced the agreement in 1939. [48] He neglected, like other German politicians, that Britain must react not only to the danger of a purely marine rival, but also to the supremacy of Europe by any aggressive military power, especially when that power is capable of threatening the Dutch and the canal ports. British debt could never be acquired by trading one factor against the other, and every country that tried to do so would necessarily cause disappointment and disillusionment, as Germany did. [59] 16 Phillips Payson O`Brien, The cabinet, Admiralty and the perception governing the formation of British naval policy, 1909, 1921-1922, 1927-1936 (Cambridge, 1992). In the late 1930s, Hitler`s disillusionment with that of the United Kingdom led German foreign policy to increasingly take the anti-uk course. [61] An important sign of Hitler`s changing perception of the United Kingdom was his decision in January 1939 to give the first priority to the navy in allocating money, skilled workers and raw materials and to launch Plan Z to build a colossal navy of 10 battleships, 16 “pocket boatmen”, 8 aircraft carriers , 5 heavy cruisers, 36 light cruisers and 249 submarines by 1944 to crush the Royal Navy. [62] Given that the fleet in Plan Z was significantly larger than was permitted in the 35:100 report in the agreement, it was inevitable that Germany would renounce it.